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Abstract—We model the coexistence of DSRC and WiFi
networks as a strategic form game with the networks as the
players. Nodes in a DSRC network must support messaging of
status updates that are time sensitive. Such nodes would like to
achieve a small age of information of status updates. In contrast,
nodes in a WiFi network would like to achieve large throughputs.
Each network chooses a medium access probability to be used by
all its nodes. We investigate Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium
strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had previ-
ously allocated the 5.9 GHz band for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
or vehicle-to/from-infrastructure (V2I) communications, also
known as Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC).
These communications include that of safety messaging, which
involves periodic broadcast of time sensitive state information
by vehicles. Also, they use the physical and MAC layer as
described in the IEEE 802.11p standard, which like WiFi
uses a carrier sense multiple access and collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA) based medium access mechanism.
More recently, to better support the demand for high data
rates, the FCC opened up 195 MHz of additional spectrum
for use by unlicensed devices in the 5.35 − 5.47 GHz and
5.85− 5.925 GHz bands. This additional spectrum can allow
802.11ac based WiFi networks to accommodate additional
wide-bandwidth channels and therefore enhance support for
high data-rate applications. However, the 5.85 − 5.925 GHz
band overlaps with the band reserved for vehicular communi-
cations leading to the possibility of WiFi networks deployed
in this band interfering with V2V and V2I communications.
Figure 1 provides an illustration in which a WiFi access point
communicates with its client in the vicinity of a V2V link.
The resulting network coexistence problem is interesting as
while both WiFi and vehicular communications use similar
medium access mechanisms they aim to optimize very dif-
ferent utilities. While WiFi networks would like to maximize
throughput, vehicular safety messaging is contingent on timely
delivery of state information being broadcast by vehicles. This
requirement of timely delivery of state is captured well by the
metric of the age of information [1].
In this work, we investigate a game theoretic approach to
the coexistence of DSRC and WiFi, where while the DSRC
network aims to minimize the age of information of updates,
WiFi devices seek to maximize their throughput. Our specific
contributions are as follows:
• We formulate a network coexistence game in strategic
form, with DSRC and WiFi networks as players. The
DSRC Tx DSRC Rx
WiFi Tx
Wi-Fi Rx
Fig. 1: Illustration of a vehicle-to-vehicle link in the vicinity of a
WiFi network.
DSRC network desires a small average age and the WiFi
network desires a large average throughput. The networks
pay a cost for transmission opportunities that are wasted
because of no transmissions by nodes or because of
collisions (multiple transmissions in the same slot). Each
network chooses a probability of medium access for all
of its nodes.
• We investigate Nash equilibrium (NE) and Stackelberg
equilibrium (SE) strategies. We demonstrate the efficacy
of these strategies via simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the related works. The network model is described
in Section III. This is followed by formulation of the game in
Section IV. The Nash and Stackelberg strategies are described
in Section IV-B and IV-C, respectively. In Section V we
discuss numerical results obtained from example networks. We
end with a summary of our observations in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent works such as [2]–[5] study the coexistence of
DSRC and WiFi. In [2] authors provide an overview of 5.9
GHz band sharing. In [3] and [4] authors study the impact of
DSRC on WiFi and vice versa. In these earlier works authors
provide an in-depth study of the inherent differences between
the two technologies, the coexistence challenges and propose
solutions to better coexistence. In our work, we look at the
coexistence problem as that of coexistence of networks that
use similar access mechanism but have different objectives.
Works such as [6]–[11] investigate age of information in
wireless networks. In [6] authors study optimal control of
status updates from a source to a remote monitor via a network
server. In [7] and [8], authors investigate scheduling strategies
that minimize age. In [9], authors study age optimization
without loss in throughput. In [10], authors analyze the age
of information over multiaccess channels. In [11], authors
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investigate minimizing the age of status updates sent by
vehicles over a carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA) network.
In this paper, we propose a game theoretic approach to study
the coexistence of DSRC and WiFi. While throughput per-
formance as the payoff function has been extensively studied
from the game theoretic point of view (for example, see [12],
[13]), age of information as a payoff function has not garnered
much attention yet. In a recent work [14], authors formulate
a two player game where one player aims to maintain the
freshness of information updates while the other player aims
to prevent this.
III. NETWORK MODEL
Our network consists of ND DSRC and NW WiFi nodes
that contend for access to the shared wireless medium. Let
N be the set of all nodes in the network. In practice, both
DSRC and WiFi nodes access the medium using a binary
exponential backoff (BEB) [15] based CSMA/CA mechanism.
While a WiFi network typically uses multiple backoff stages,
the DSRC network uses just one backoff stage for safety
messaging [3].
In this work, we eschew the detailed workings of the BEB
protocol. Instead we approximate its workings in the following
manner. We assume that all nodes can sense each other’s
packet transmissions. This allows modeling the BEB as a
slotted multiaccess system. Further, we assume that all nodes
always have a packet to send. Also, a packet transmission by a
node has a constant probability of collision. These latter two
assumptions allow summarizing the parameters of the BEB
(number of backoff stages and contention window sizes [15])
in terms of the probability with which a node transmits in a
slot and the probability that a node’s transmission will end in
a collision.
Let τi denote the access probability with which node i
accesses the wireless medium. Let pI be the probability of
an idle slot, which is a slot in which no node transmits. Also,
let p(−i)I be the probability of the event that no node in the set
of nodes not including node i, transmits in a slot. We have
pI =
|N |∏
i=1
(1− τi) and p(−i)I =
|N |∏
j=1
j 6=i
(1− τj). (1)
A packet transmission by a node is successful in a slot only
if no other node transmits packet in the slot. Let pS be the
probability of a successful transmission in a slot, p(i)S be the
probability of a successful transmission by node i, and p(−i)S
be the probability of a successful transmission in a slot by a
node other than node i. We have
pS =
|N |∑
i=1
τi
|N |∏
j=1
j 6=i
(1− τj), p(i)S = τi
|N |∏
j=1
j 6=i
(1− τj),
and p(−i)S =
|N |∑
j=1
j 6=i
τj
|N |∏
k=1
k 6=j
(1− τk). (2)
∆i(t)
t
σS
∆i(0)
Zi0 Zi1 Zi2 Zin
Zi1
ti1 ti2 ti3 tin ti(n+1)
Fig. 2: Example sample path of the age ∆i(t) of DSRC node
i. The time tij is the time of its jth successful update.
Let σI , σS and σC denote the lengths of an idle, successful
and collision slot, respectively.
Next we define the throughput of a WiFi node and the age
of information (AoI) of a DSRC node in terms of the above
probabilities and slot lengths.
A. Throughput of a WiFi node
Given the assumption that a node always has a packet to
transmit, we may define the throughput of a node [15] to be
the fraction of an average slot that constitutes a successful
transmission by the node. Let Ti be the throughput of WiFi
node i. We define
Ti =
p
(i)
S σS
σIpI + σSpS + σC(1− pI − pS) . (3)
Note that the denominator in the above equation is the ex-
pected value of the length of a slot. The numerator is the
average length occupied by a successful transmission by i.
B. Age of Information of a DSRC node
Figure 2 shows an example sample path of the instantaneous
age ∆i(t) of a certain DSRC node i. We will calculate the age
of information of node i using time average analysis as in [10].
We summarize it here for completeness.
Let tij be the time of the jth successfully transmitted update
packet by node i. The time between the jth and (j + 1)th
update by node i is the inter-update time Zij = ti(j+1) − tij .
Let the Zij of node i be identically distributed as Zi. The
time average age of updates of i is the area under the age
graph normalized by the time interval of observation. Over an
interval (0, t′), it is 〈∆i〉t′ = 1t′
∫ t′
0
∆i(t)dt. We can rewrite
〈∆i〉t′ as
〈∆i〉t′ = T0
t′
+
n
t′
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
Z2ij
2
+ σSZij
)
. (4)
where, T0 =
Z2i0
2 +Zi0∆i(0) and σS , as before, is the length of
successful slot, which is the time a successful update takes to
get transmitted. The age of information (AoI) of DSRC node
i is
∆i = lim
t′→∞
〈∆i〉t′ = E[Z
2
i ]
2E[Zi]
+ σS . (5)
Next we characterize Zi in terms of the slot lengths and the
probabilities in equations (1) and (2).
The inter-arrival time Zi consists of a random number L
slots. The first L − 1 of these slots are slots in which node
i is unable to transmit successfully. This is followed by the
Lth slot in which i transmits successfully. We can write the
inter-update time Zi as
Zi = Y1 + Y2 + · · ·+ YL−1 +X. (6)
The random variable X is the length of Lth slot and takes
a value of σs with probability 1. Now consider Yl, which is
the length of lth slot, where 1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1. In such a slot
node i does not update successfully, which is an event that
occurs with probability 1 − p(i)S . Such a slot could therefore
be an idle slot, or a slot that has a successful transmission by
a node other than the node i, or a slot that has a collision. The
PMF of Yl is thus given by
P [Yl = y] =

pI
1−p(i)S
y = σI ,
p
(−i)
S
1−p(i)S
y = σS ,
1−p(−i)I −p(−i)S
1−p(i)S
y = σC ,
0 otherwise.
(7)
The number of slots L is a geometric random variable with
PMF
P [L = l] =
{
p
(i)
S (1− p(i)S )l−1 l ≥ 1,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Note that the random variables Yl, 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1, X , and L
are mutually independent. Using this fact, we can write
E[Zi] = (E[L]− 1)E[Y ] + E[X], (9)
E[Z2i ] = (E[L]− 1)(E[Y 2] + 2E[X]E[Y ])
+ (E[L2]− 3E[L] + 2)E[Y ]2 + E[X2]. (10)
Note that E[X] = σS and E[X2] = σ2S . The moments
of Y and L can be obtained from their PMF(s) given by
equations (7) and (8), respectively. They can be used to
calculate the moments of Zi, which can be used to calculate
AoI by using (5). Lemma 1 summarizes these moments and
the resulting AoI.
Lemma 1. For CSMA/CA based access, the first and second
moments of the inter-update time of node i and the corre-
sponding age of information are given by
E[Zi] =
σIpI + σS(p
(−i)
S + p
(i)
S ) + σC(1− p(−i)I − p(−i)S )
p
(i)
S
,
E[Z2i ] = 2E[Zi]
2 + σ2S − 2σSE[Zi]
+
σ2IpI + σ
2
Sp
(−i)
S + σ
2
C(1− p(−i)I − p(−i)S )
p
(i)
S
,
∆i =
σIpI + σS(p
(−i)
S + p
(i)
S ) + σC(1− p(−i)I − p(−i)S )
p
(i)
S
+
σ2IpI + σ
2
S(p
(−i)
S + p
(i)
S ) + σ
2
C(1− p(−i)I − p(−i)S )
2(σIpI + σS(p
(−i)
S + p
(i)
S ) + σC(1− p(−i)I − p(−i)S )
.
IV. GAME MODEL
We model the coexistence of DSRC and WiFi networks as
a non-cooperative game. This network coexistence game is
defined in strategic form next. We have
• Players: We have two players namely the DSRC and
WiFi networks. Recall they have ND and NW nodes,
respectively.
• Strategy: Each network can choose the probability with
which all its nodes access the shared medium from (0, 1).
Let τD and τW be the choice of access probabilities made
by the DSRC and WiFi networks, respectively.
• Payoff: The DSRC network has an average age of
information ∆(τD, τW ). On the other hand, the WiFi
network achieves an average throughput T (τD, τW ). Let
c(τD, τW ) be the cost of playing the game. The payoffs
of the DSRC and WiFi networks are respectively
uD(τD, τW ) = −∆(τD, τW )− c(τD, τW ), (11)
uW (τD, τW ) = T (τD, τW )− c(τD, τW ). (12)
The networks would like to maximize their payoffs.
In what follows, we will set σI = β, 0 < β < 1, and we
will assume that the lengths of a successful transmission slot
and that of a collision slot are the same. Specifically, σS =
σC = (1+β). In practice, the idle slot is much smaller than a
collision or a successful transmission slot, that is, β << 1. The
resulting average throughput and average age of information
are
T (τD, τW ) =
τW (1− τW )(NW−1)(1− τD)ND (1 + β)
1− (1− τW )NW (1− τD)ND + β ,
(13)
∆(τD, τW ) =
1− (1− τD)ND (1− τW )NW + β
τD(1− τD)(ND−1)(1− τW )NW +
β
2
+
(1 + β)(1− (1− τD)ND (1− τW )NW )
2(1− (1− τD)ND (1− τW )NW + β) . (14)
A. Cost of idling and collision
We penalize the networks for wastage of spectrum that
occurs as a result of idle slots or due to collisions (say because
either network chooses an aggressive access probability). The
cost function c(τD, τW ) is defined as
c(τD, τW ) = widlepI + wcol(1− pI − pS) (15)
= widle(1− τD)ND (1− τW )NW
+ wcol
(
1− (1− τD)ND (1− τW )NW
−NDτD(1− τD)(ND−1)(1− τW )NW
−NW τW (1− τW )(NW−1)(1− τD)ND
)
(16)
where, widle ≥ 0 and wcol ≥ 0 allow flexibility in how idle
and collision slots are penalized, for example, by a spectrum
regulator, with the goal of enabling effective use of the shared
spectrum.
Next we consider in turn the Nash equilibrium strategy
(τ̂D, τ̂W ) and the Stackelberg strategy (τ˜D, τ˜W ).
B. Nash Strategies
As stated in [16], a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game G = (N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) is a strategy
profile s∗ ∈ S such that ∀i ∈ N
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si, (17)
where N is the set of players, Si is the strategy set of player
i and ui is the payoff of i.
Also, a non-cooperative game G has atleast one pure
strategy Nash equilbrium if ∀i ∈ N
1) the corresponding strategy set Si is non-empty, convex
and compact subset of some Euclidean space RM
2) ui(si, s−i) is a continuous function in the profile of
strategies s ∈ S and quasi-concave in si.
The following theorem states the existence of NE for our
network coexistence game.
Theorem 1. The network coexistence game defined in Sec-
tion IV has at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Specifically, the payoffs uD(τD, τW ) and uW (τD, τW ) are
quasi-concave in τD ∈ (0, 1) and τW ∈ (0, 1), respectively,
for widle, wcol ≥ 0, 0 < β < 1, and ND, NW ≥ 1.
The proof is given in the Appendices at the end.
C. Stackelberg Strategies
We study the Stackelberg equilibrium when the DSRC
network is the leader and the WiFi network is the follower
and vice versa. We first discuss the game where the DSRC
network is the leader and define the optimal response (or
optimal reaction) set RW of the follower (the WiFi network)
to the strategy of the leader. The optimal response of the WiFi
network is given by
RW (τD) = {τW ∈ (0, 1) : uW (τD, τW ) ≥ uW (τD, t),
∀t ∈ (0, 1)}. (18)
We now define the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the
DSRC network. A strategy τ˜D is called a Stackelberg strategy
for the leader, if
min
τW∈RW (τ˜D)
uD(τ˜D, τW ) = max
τD∈(0,1)
min
τW∈RW (τD)
uD(τD, τW ),
(19)
where minτW∈RW (τ˜D) uD(τ˜D, τW ) is the Stackelberg payoff
for the leader. The definition for when the WiFi network is
the leader can be obtained by swapping the subscripts D and
W in equations (18) and (19).
V. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
In this section, we discuss results from simulations. We
begin by discussing the impact of access probability on the
average throughput and average AoI. We compute the Nash
equilibrium strategies for different selections of ND and NW
and highlight the impact of selection of weights widle and wcol
on the Nash equilibrium strategies and the obtained AoI and
throughput values. Finally, we compare the NE strategies with
the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies1. For the results shown,
the networks were allowed to choose access probabilities τD
and τW from the interval [0.01, 0.99].
Impact of access probability on average AoI and average
throughput: Figure 3a shows the AoI as a function of τD for
a DSRC network that has a single node, for different numbers
of nodes in the WiFi network. Nodes in the WiFi network
accesses the channel with probability τW = 0.2. The AoI
achieved by the single node DSRC network increases with
increase in the number of nodes in the WiFi network. This is
because the larger the number of nodes in the WiFi network the
smaller is the fraction of slots over which the DSRC network
transmits successfully. Also, for any selection of size of WiFi
network, the DSRC network sees AoI reduce as the chosen
τD increases. More generally, as can be seen from (14), when
there is only a single DSRC node, AoI reduces with increasing
τD. Figure 3b shows the AoI for when the DSRC network has
5 nodes. A DSRC node must now suffer contention from other
DSRC nodes too. This self-contention penalizes the DSRC
network for selection of large access probabilities. As is seen
in the figure, the AoI is no longer monotonically decreasing.
Finally, as was in the case of ND = 1, the presence of a larger
WiFi network sees AoI increase for any selection of τD.
In general, we observe that increased self-contention (more
DSRC nodes) makes larger τD less desirable. However, in-
creased competition (more WiFi nodes) doesn’t have a similar
impact on selection of τD. Similar observations hold for the
WiFi network. Figure 3c shows the throughput when there is
just one WiFi node. The node sees its throughput reduce for
larger τW across different numbers of nodes in the competing
DSRC network. On the other hand when the number of nodes
in the WiFi network is 5, as seen in Figure 3d, it is more
beneficial for the network to choose smaller τW . Finally,
larger numbers of competing nodes cause a drop in throughput
achieved for any selection of τW .
Nash equilibrium for the network coexistence game: We
start by considering the case when the networks don’t pay
any cost for wastage of spectrum, that is widle = wcol = 0.
Figures 4a-4c shows the best response functions of the net-
works. The highlighted rows in Table I show the corresponding
AoI and throughputs. The AoI (resp. throughput) of the DSRC
(resp. WiFi) network increases (resp. decreases) as the number
of nodes in the network increases for a fixed number of nodes
of the other network. Now consider the rows of Table I that
have ND = 2 DSRC nodes. As the numbers of WiFi nodes
increase from NW = 1 to NW = 5, the access probability
chosen by the DSRC network sees very little change. However,
the access probability chosen by the WiFi network goes from
a high of 0.99 for NW = 1 to a low of 0.18 for NW = 5.
Now consider the rows that have NW = 2. One of the rows has
ND = 2 and the other has ND = 5. Again, the WiFi network’s
choice of access probability stays unaffected in comparison
1To solve for the equilibrium, we linearly rescale ∆ to the range of T .
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Fig. 3: Impact of access probability on AoI and throughput. Fig-
ures 3a-3b show access probability (τD) vs. AoI (∆) for ND = 1 and
ND = 5, respectively, for NW = 1, 2, 5 and τW = 0.2. Figures 3c-
3d show access probability (τW ) vs. throughput (T ) for NW = 1
and NW = 5, respectively, for ND = 1, 2, 5 and τD = 0.2.
ND NW (τ̂D, τ̂W ) ∆(τ̂D, τ̂W ) T (τ̂D, τ̂W )
1 1 (0.99, 0.99) 101.6015 0.0099
2 1 (0.50, 0.99) 399.8980 0.2494
2 2 (0.46, 0.46) 12.9614 0.0803
2 5 (0.44, 0.18) 9.9417 0.0288
5 1 (0.20, 0.99) 1218.4 0.3268
5 2 (0.18, 0.44) 35.2623 0.1060
5 5 (0.17, 0.17) 26.8100 0.0380
TABLE I: Nash Equilibrium, AoI and throughput values for varying
ND and NW and widle = 0, wcol = 0 and β = 0.001. The
highlighted rows correspond to Figures 4a-4c.
to a big change from 0.46 to 0.17 for the DSRC network. In
summary, while self-contention can lead to significant changes
in choice of strategy, the strategy is relatively indifferent to
changes in competition.
Figures 4d-4f show the best response functions of the net-
works when a penalty is imposed for wastage of spectrum. We
chose widle = β and wcol = 1+β, where β = 0.001. Table II
shows the NE and the corresponding AoI and throughput
values. Since, widle < wcol, the cost of an idle slot is less
than the cost of a collision, the players are less aggressive,
their access probabilities are smaller, when compared to those
for the no cost case tabulated in Table I. Also, as in the
absence of costs, unlike changes in competition, changes in
self-contention lead to significant changes in the choice of
access probabilities. Curiously, we obtain multiple NE for
ND = 1 and NW = 1 (Figure 4d). Observe that, among the
three NE, the strategy (0.61, 0.03) has both players do better.
Appropriate weight selection may lead to more efficient use
of spectrum: Appropriate choice of weights widle and wcol
may in fact nudge the networks to adopt strategies that lead to
close to optimum sharing of the spectrum. We say that sharing
is optimum when the AoI (resp. throughput) of a DSRC
(resp. WiFi) node when using the equilibrium strategy is what
it would be if one were to minimize AoI (resp. maximize
throughput) of a network with the same number of total nodes,
however, all of the DSRC (resp. WiFi) type.
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Fig. 4: Best response functions for various ND and NW . For
Figures 4a-4c, we set widle = 0 and wcol = 0. For Figures 4d-4f,
we set widle = β and wcol = 1 + β, where β = 0.001.
ND NW (τ̂D, τ̂W ) ∆(τ̂D, τ̂W ) T (τ̂D, τ̂W )
1 1 (0.10, 0.99) 983.0260 0.8981
(0.61, 0.03) 1.5489 0.0174
(0.99, 0.01) 1.5117 0.0001
2 1 (0.07, 0.99) 1436.3 0.8549
2 2 (0.07, 0.19) 10.2393 0.3035
2 5 (0.07, 0.06) 8.6200 0.1115
5 5 (0.01, 0.05) 35.2475 0.1460
TABLE II: Nash Equilibrium, AoI and throughput values for varying
values of ND and NW with widle = β, wcol = 1 + β, where
β = 0.001. The highlighted rows correspond to Figures 4d-4f.
Table III shows the access probabilities τ∗D and τ
∗
W and
the corresponding AoI and throughput values. Specifically, the
first row that corresponds to N = 2 shows the minimum age
∆(τ∗D) (resp. maximum throughput T (τ
∗
W )) that a DSRC node
(resp. WiFi node) may achieve if only a N = 2 node DSRC
(resp. WiFi) network were to access the medium. Table IV
shows a selection of weights, that nudges the networks closer
to optimum sharing. Observe that selecting widle = 0.001 and
wcol = 150, for ND = 1 and NW = 1, gives us AoI and
throughput values that are close to the values in the row for
N = 2 in Table III. Similarly, optimum sharing is achieved
for ND = NW = 2 and ND = NW = 5, by choosing widle =
0.001 and wcol = 400.
Stackelberg equilibrium for the network coexistence game:
We solve for SE under two scenarios, (a) DSRC network is
the leader and (b) WiFi network is the leader. Table V and
Table VI show the SE and corresponding AoI and throughput
values for different selections of ND and NW for the two
scenarios, respectively, when (i) widle = 0 and wcol = 0, and
(ii) widle > 0 and wcol > 0.
N τ∗D ∆(τ
∗
D) τ
∗
W T (τ
∗
W )
2 0.0268 2.5576 0.0306 0.4847
4 0.0119 4.6505 0.0126 0.2407
10 0.0100 11.0723 0.0100 0.0946
TABLE III: Optimal access probabilities τ∗D (resp. τ∗W ) and the
corresponding AoI (resp. throughput) for nodes in a network that has
only N DSRC (resp. WiFi) nodes.
ND NW widle wcol (τ̂D, τ̂W ) ∆(τ̂D, τ̂W ) T (τ̂D, τ̂W )
1 1 0.001 150 (0.04, 0.04) 2.5793 0.4878
(0.06, 0.02) 1.8154 0.2163
(0.08, 0.01) 1.6319 0.1003
2 2 0.001 400 (0.01, 0.01) 4.7179 0.2442
5 5 0.001 400 (0.01, 0.01) 11.0723 0.0946
TABLE IV: Nash Equilibrium, AoI and throughput values obtained
for different weight selections with the goal of nudging the networks
to a close to optimum (see Table III) use of spectrum.
DSRC network as leader
ND NW (τ˜D, τ˜W ) ∆(τ˜D, τ˜W ) T (τ˜D, τ˜W )
1 1 (0.99, 0.99) 101.6015 0.0099
2 2 (0.32, 0.42) 12.2014 0.1328
5 5 (0.10, 0.15) 25.2029 0.0615
WiFi network as leader
1 1 (0.99, 0.99) 101.5607 0.0099
2 2 (0.41, 0.30) 7.3323 0.0857
5 5 (0.15, 0.10) 16.7464 0.0405
TABLE V: Stackelberg equilibrium strategies, AoI and throughput
values for (a) DSRC network is the leader and (b) WiFi network is
the leader. We set widle = 0, wcol = 0 and β = 0.001.
In Table V, when the WiFi network is the leader and
no spectrum wastage penalty is imposed, for ND = 2 and
NW = 2, AoI at SE is 7.3323 and the throughput is 0.0857.
On comparing these values with their corresponding NE
counterparts in Table I, i.e. AoI of 12.9614 and throughput
of 0.0803, we see that while the leader sees a minor increase
of 0.0054 in throughput, the follower sees a considerable
reduction of 5.6291 in AoI. This is also seen for when ND = 5
and NW = 5. In these scenarios, there is a clear advantage to
be a follower. The leader does at least as well as when using
the NE strategy.
On the imposition of a spectrum wastage penalty, however,
the leader may benefit greatly while the follower suffers. To
exemplify, consider, in Table VI, the SE strategy for ND = 5
and NW = 5, when DSRC is the leader. The AoI at SE is
9.5057 and the throughput is 0.0043. The corresponding values
when using the NE strategy (Table II) are an AoI of 35.2475
and a throughput of 0.1460. This can be explained by a cost
of idling that is much lower than that of collisions. It makes
the follower’s best response access probabilities small.
VI. CONCLUSION
We formulated a strategic form game with DSRC and WiFi
networks as players. The DSRC network desires a small age of
information while the WiFi network desires a large throughput.
Each network chooses the probability with which its nodes
access the medium. We demonstrated Nash and Stackelberg
equilibrium strategies for the game.
DSRC network as leader
ND NW (τ˜D, τ˜W ) ∆(τ˜D, τ˜W ) T (τ˜D, τ˜W )
1 1 (0.61, 0.03) 1.5489 0.0174
2 2 (0.43, 0.01) 3.2848 0.0049
5 5 (0.21, 0.01) 9.5057 0.0043
WiFi network as leader
1 1 (0.10, 0.99) 983.0260 0.8981
2 2 (0.07, 0.19) 10.2393 0.3035
5 5 (0.01, 0.05) 35.2475 0.1460
TABLE VI: Stackelberg equilibrium strategies, AoI and throughput
values for (a) DSRC network is the leader and (b) WiFi network is
the leader for widle = β, wcol = 1 + β, where β = 0.001.
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APPENDIX A
QUASI-CONCAVITY OF THE PAYOFF OF THE DSRC NODE
The payoff uD(τD, τW ) of the DSRC node is given by equa-
tion (11). We need to show that the payoff is quasi-concave
in τD. This is equivalent to showing that −uD(τD, τW ) is
quasi-convex in τD. Define QW = (1 − τW )NW and Q′W =
NW τW (1−τW )(NW−1). The derivative of −uD(τD, τW ) with
respect to τD is
∂(−uD(τD, τW ))
∂τD
= α1(τD) + α2(τD) + αcol(τD)
− αidle(τD),
where
α1(τD) =
β(1 + β)
2
QWND(1− τD)ND−1
(1 + β − (1− τD)NDQW )2 ,
α2(τD) =
1
τ2D
(
1 +
(1 + β)(NDτD − 1)
QW (1− τD)ND
)
,
αcol(τD) = wcol(QWND(ND − 1)τD(1− τD)ND−2
+Q′WND(1− τD)ND−1),
αidle(τD) = widleQWND(1− τD)ND−1. (20)
To prove quasi-convexity of −uD(τD, τW ) we will argue that
as τD decreases from 1 to 0, the derivative
∂(−uD(τD,τW ))
∂τD
goes from being positive to negative, and no other changes in
its sign take place. In other words, as τD goes from 0 to 1,
−uD(τD, τW ) is monotonically decreasing in τD followed by
being monotonically increasing.
We start by considering the case when widle, wcol = 0. The
derivative is positive for all τD ∈ [1/ND, 1) since both α1(τD)
and α2(τD) are positive for such τD.
For a certain 0 < τD < 1/ND, α2(τD) becomes negative
and stays negative as τD → 0. Further, as τD → 0, the absolute
value of α2(τD) grows faster and dominates α1(τD). This is
because, as τD becomes small, given that 0 < QW < 1 and
0 < β < 1, 1/τ2D > (1−τD)ND−1/(1+β−(1−τD)NDQW )2.
As τD → 0, α2(τD) becomes negative, eventually the deriva-
tive becomes negative, and given the faster growth of the
absolute value of α2(τD), the derivative stays negative.
Now consider the case when widle, wcol > 0. Note
that if widle is small enough to not make the derivative
∂(−uD(τD,τW ))
∂τD
in (20) negative as τD goes from 1 to 0, then
quasi-convexity of −uD(τD, τW ) follows as for the case of
widle, wcol = 0.
Consider the case when widle is large and a large αidle(τD)
causes the derivative to become negative at some τD = τˆ
before the rapid reduction in α2(τD) for small τD as τD → 0.
It is sufficient to show that the derivative stays negative
for all τD ∈ (0, τˆ). Note that α2(τD) decreases monotoni-
cally as τD goes from 1 to 0 and hence cannot cause the
derivative to change sign as τD → 0. The term αcol(τD)
corresponding to collision costs becomes larger as τD → 0.
However, the derivative of αcol(τD)/αidle(τD) is positive for
all 0 ≤ τD < 1. Thus the ratio decreases as τD → 0 and
αidle(τD)− αcol(τD) increases. This leaves the term α1(τD)
for us to consider. We can rewrite the term as
α1(τD) =
QWND(1− τD)ND−1
2(1+β)
β
(
1− (1−τD)NDQW1+β
)2 . (21)
Comparing the numerator with αidle in (20), it is clear that the
increase in the denominator in (21) as τD → 0 will determine
whether α1(τD) can change the derivative to positive before
α2(τD) makes it negative. Let τ ′ be the value of τD at which
the denominator of (21) becomes 1, as τD goes from 1 to 0.
Note that the denominator decreases monotonically as τD →
0. Let τ˜ be the value of τD at which α2(τD) becomes zero.
For τD smaller than τ˜ , α2(τD) will be negative. We have,
using (21),
τ ′ = 1−
((
(1 + β)−
√
β(1 + β)
2
)
1
QW
)1/ND
< 1−
(
(1 + β)−
√
β(1 + β)
2
)1/ND
. (22)
Note that no such τ ′ > 0 may exist. The second inequality is
obtained by observing that 0 < QW < 1. The right-hand-side
of the second inequality gives an upperbound on τ ′. Setting
α2(τD) = 0, defined in (20), we can see that τ˜ is obtained by
solving
1−ND τ˜ = QW
1 + β
(1− τ˜)ND . (23)
The smallest value of τ˜ , for any given β and ND, is obtained
for QW = 1. It can be verified that this smallest value is
larger than the upper bound on τ ′ given by (22). This implies
that the denominator of α1(τD) becomes smaller than 1, if at
all, only after α2(τD) becomes negative. The fact that α2(τD)
grows negative faster than α1(τD) grows positive implies the
derivative stays negative over (0, τˆ).
APPENDIX B
QUASI-CONCAVITY OF THE PAYOFF OF THE WIFI NODE
We want to show that −uW (τD, τW ) is quasi-convex.
Define QD = (1− τD)ND and Q′D = NDτD(1− τD)(ND−1).
The derivative ∂(−uW (τD,τW ))∂τW is given by
∂(−uW (τD, τW ))
∂τW
= α(τW ) + αcol(τW )− αidle(τW ),
where,
α(τW ) = QD(1 + β)(1− τW )NW−2(
QD(1− τW )NW + (1 + β)(τWNW − 1)
(1−QD(1− τW )NW + β)2
)
,
αcol(τW ) = wcol(QDNW (NW − 1)τW (1− τW )NW−2
+Q′DNW (1− τW )NW−1),
αidle(τW ) = widleQDNW (1− τW )NW−1. (24)
It is a fact that α(τW )/αidle(τW ) is monotonically in-
creasing as τW goes from 0 to 1. The same is also
true for αcol(τW )/αidle(τW ). Also, as τW goes from 0
to 1, α(τW ) monotonically increases, while αcol(τW ) and
αidle(τW ) monotonically decreases.
Consider τW ∈ [1/NW , 1). Note that α(τW ), αcol(τW ), and
αidle(τW ) are all positive. The partial derivative may become
negative at a certain τ˜ ∈ [1/NW , 1) in case αidle is large. If so,
then the derivative stays negative over all τW ∈ (0, τ˜). This is
simply because, as mentioned above, α(τW )/αidle(τW ) and
αcol(τW )/αidle(τW ) are monotonically increasing in τW . So
αidle(τW ) − α(τW ) and αidle(τW ) − αcol(τW ) increase as
τW → 0.
Now consider the case when τW ∈ (0, 1/NW ) and
αidle(τW ) stays smaller than α(τW ) + αcol(τW ) for τW ∈
(1/NW , 1). In this case, the derivative in (24) may stay
positive for all τW ∈ (0, 1/NW ) or may become negative
at a certain τ˜ ∈ (0, 1/NW ). Need clarification: One way
the latter could happen is due to α(τW ) becoming negative
and in turn causing α(τW ) + αcol(τW ) to become smaller
than αidle(τW ). As explained earlier, if αidle(τ˜) exceeds
α(τ˜) + αcol(τ˜), αidle(τW ) is greater than α(τW ) + αcol(τW )
for all τW ∈ (0, τ˜).
In summary, the derivative in (24) either stays positive over
all τW or it goes from positive to negative as τW decreases
from 1 to 0. Thus, −uW (τD, τW ) is quasi-convex.
